Britain's Competition and Markets Authority has unveiled provisional findings recommending that both Google and Apple receive 'Strategic Market Status' designations under the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act (DMCCA). The ruling would subject their mobile platforms—including Android and iOS operating systems, app stores, mobile browsers and browser engines—to new regulatory obligations. This marks the second designation investigation under the DMCCA framework, following an earlier probe into Google's search and search advertising operations.

Responses to the CMA's proposed interventions have been sharply divided. Epic Games, developer of Fortnite, dismissed the measures as a "missed opportunity to introduce competition into a currently-monopolized market." Tom Smith, a competition lawyer and former CMA director, told The Guardian that the authority is "ducking issues that would really threaten the entrenched positions of Apple and Google, and which might therefore draw political heat." By contrast, Mozilla and Open Web Advocacy have backed the DMCCA's objectives and urged the CMA to enforce it rigorously, cautioning against government interference in the regulator's work.

The CMA has signalled that its initial remedies will "prioritize measures which complement international action," citing the European Digital Markets Act, Brazil's action against Apple, Japan's Mobile Software Competition Act, and US litigation including Epic Games Inc vs Apple Inc and Epic Games Inc vs Google LLC. Yet stakeholders including Epic Games have expressed frustration that the UK's approach stops short of obligations imposed elsewhere, particularly the requirement to permit third-party app stores. The CMA appears to be adopting a wait-and-see posture regarding enforcement outcomes in other jurisdictions before implementing comparable obligations.

More aggressive remedies have been sidelined, notably an investigation into Apple's App Tracking Transparency policy. The CMA itself acknowledges that this policy restricts cross-app tracking only for third-party applications while exempting Apple's own services, effectively steering developers toward reliance on Apple's monetization infrastructure and ceding control over app economics to the platform operator.

A measured, phased approach to remedies carries some logic, with the CMA potentially reserving tougher interventions as future leverage. However, given the UK government's recent Strategic Steer emphasizing growth and investment, coupled with demonstrated willingness to compromise the CMA's autonomy, there is concern that the regulatory regime could be progressively weakened. The two roadmaps released by the CMA suggest the authority may be treading cautiously in addressing the market dominance wielded by Apple and Google.

What are the proposed remedies?

The CMA has outlined category 1 measures—remedies to be prioritized immediately upon designation—in separate roadmaps for Google and Apple. These include:

  • Mandating that Apple and Google conduct app reviews for distribution in their respective app stores using fair, objective and transparent criteria, with explanations for delays or rejections and advance notice of material changes to review processes or guidelines.
  • Requiring fair, objective and transparent app ranking in both stores, with disclosure of ranking methodologies.
  • Prohibiting Apple and Google from leveraging app review data unfairly, such as informing their own app development efforts.
  • Requiring Apple to permit app developers to direct customers away from the App Store (steering).
  • Obligating Apple to fairly and objectively evaluate third-party requests for interoperable access to operating system features, including Bluetooth detection, high-speed connectivity, file sharing, voice assistants, AirPods integration, wearable notifications, AirPlay functionality, wearable ecosystem APIs and Find My features.

These proposed interventions draw heavily from the CMA's 2022 mobile markets study, a detailed examination of Apple and Google's mobile ecosystems that identified the pair's longstanding duopoly in the UK and pinpointed areas where competition was being suppressed. The study predicted both firms would meet Strategic Market Status criteria and recommended implementing the interventions now being proposed under the DMCCA.

The 2022 study had flagged opacity in app store search rankings and inadequate separation between app development and app review teams, which enabled practices such as app copying or "Sherlocking." It recommended requiring Apple and Google to maintain transparent app review processes and grant third parties greater access to operating system capabilities. The current category 1 proposals appear to have incorporated these recommendations.

Category 2 interventions, scheduled for potential implementation in the first half of 2026, encompass additional study recommendations. These include requiring Apple to provide access to Near Field Communication (NFC) functionality (tap-to-pay) on more equitable terms, enabling interoperability with third-party connected devices, and allowing users to set new defaults for digital wallets, browsers and app stores.

What are the policy objectives?

Discrepancies exist between the original market study and the current proposed remedies. The 2022 study stated that "high-level objectives" should involve "addressing the sources of Apple's and Google's market power, by opening up the core markets in the mobile ecosystem to greater competition." It therefore recommended a broader set of interventions, including preventing Apple from self-preferencing its own ad networks through App Tracking Transparency, ensuring commission rates for in-app transactions are set fairly, and improving data transfer and switching APIs to facilitate user migration between iOS and Android. Many of these recommendations have either been omitted or relegated to lower priority.

The shift appears to reflect changed priorities. When explaining why improved data transfer and operating system switching were removed as enforcement priorities, the CMA stated that such intervention is "less likely to directly contribute to delivering our overarching goal of unlocking innovation for app developers." This signals a preference for creating fairer conditions at platform edges rather than reducing the market power of dominant firms. Yet both the original market study and an early DMCCA impact assessment had called for targeting the "underlying sources of this market power."

Do the proposed remedies target Apple and Google's market power?

Assessing the scope of these remedies reveals their limitations in addressing market concentration. The CMA recognises how defaults and integrations—such as Google's Gemini integration into Android—can distort competition in one firm's favour. It also acknowledges that Apple and Google's ecosystem control extends to access conditions, which the CMA intends to improve in specific domains including operating system features, mobile wallets and connected devices. The CMA is intervening against anti-steering practices to enable developers to bypass Apple and Google payment systems, though fees may still apply. It is also considering whether Progressive Web Apps warrant intervention to become a more viable alternative for developers seeking to circumvent app stores entirely, depending on developer interest.

Overall, the CMA's remedies aim to improve competition at platform peripheries while largely preserving Google and Apple's ability to set and control the conditions under which third parties compete. Platform access will not be unconditionally granted; instead, the CMA will seek to enhance transparency for those seeking access. While transparency improvements are valuable, decision-making authority remains with the gatekeepers.

The CMA does deserve credit for proposing to prevent Apple and Google from using non-public app developer information for their own first-party app development, which represents a significant informational advantage. However, Apple maintains broader information and ecosystem advantages through its extensive governance structures, encompassing app download data, in-app purchase data, app review and notarization data, app advertising and attribution data, App Store Ads data, and provisions in the Developer License Agreement granting Apple unrestricted access to developer information.

Whether the CMA will implement structural separation addressing this full array of information and ecosystem advantages, or will focus narrowly on app review data alone, remains uncertain. If the CMA declines to dismantle the underlying sources of information and ecosystem advantages that generate market power for Strategic Market Status firms, preferring instead to foster competition only at platform margins, structural remedies are unlikely to materialise. Nevertheless, the DMCCA's flexibility could permit more ambitious structural remedies through future conduct requirements or pro-competition interventions, contingent on the CMA's stated objectives and its willingness to confront concentrated power in the digital economy.

Source: Tech Policy Press