A proposal unveiled by the European Commission on October 27 would grant the EU border agency Frontex authority to identify and flag illegal online material, putting pressure on key safeguards embedded in the Digital Services Act. The initiative, part of a broader overhaul of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, would create an Online Monitoring and Response Center tasked with countering smuggling networks that exploit social media to organize unauthorized border crossings. Frontex would seek recognition as a "trusted flagger" under the DSA while simultaneously retaining the ability to request that national authorities issue formal removal orders or demand user data from platforms.

Twenty-eight civil rights organizations across Europe are urging the Commission to abandon the proposal, contending that it threatens to erode the DSA's protections against state interference in content moderation. The concern centers on what critics describe as a problematic fusion of distinct roles that the DSA was designed to keep separate.

How trusted flaggers work under the DSA

Trusted flaggers are entities certified for their skill in spotting particular categories of unlawful online material under the DSA framework. As of November 6, national coordinators had approved 90 trusted flaggers spanning 22 member states, according to the European Commission. This roster encompasses child safety organizations, anti-discrimination advocates, fact-checking services, consumer groups, copyright owners and commercial anti-piracy operators. A small number are government bodies—specifically financial regulators in Austria, Belgium, Ireland and Portugal that report fraud and scams. No EU agency or law enforcement organization currently holds this status.

Under Article 22 of the DSA, platforms must treat notices from trusted flaggers as urgent and handle them promptly. However, this designation does not authorize removal of content. Platforms retain full responsibility for evaluating notices and determining their response. The Commission maintains that its Frontex proposal honors this distinction, yet the plan would also permit Frontex to ask national authorities to compel platforms to delete material under Article 9 or disclose user details under Article 10—a combination that sits at the heart of the controversy.

Commission guidance reveals a potential tension

The Frontex proposal arrives as the Commission drafts guidance on how the trusted flagger system should function across member states. In May, it released draft guidelines addressing the selection of trusted flaggers, their autonomy, reporting duties, and procedures for suspension or removal. These guidelines aim to assist national Digital Services Coordinators in applying DSA rules uniformly. Public consultation ran until July 10, with final adoption planned for the second half of 2026.

Paragraph 31 of the draft guidelines advises that trusted flaggers should not overlap with public authorities holding power to issue binding removal orders. The Commission specifically recommends that national coordinators ensure authorities empowered to issue Article 9 orders "should not commingle such powers with the trusted flagger status." Only bodies without such authority, or autonomous departments of larger agencies with "sufficient management and operational autonomy" and absolutely no power to issue orders, should qualify.

The guidelines illustrate this principle through two scenarios. One example of sound practice shows a coordinator rejecting trusted flagger status for a market surveillance authority capable of issuing removal orders, "to avoid situations in which the providers of online platforms are unable to distinguish the capacity in which such an authority is acting." A contrasting example of poor practice depicts a platform mistaking notices from an autonomous department as binding orders, even though the department lacks authority to issue them. The Commission warns this creates "confusion between notices and orders, thereby undermining the clear separation" the DSA intends.

Rights advocates contend that Frontex's proposed arrangement would produce precisely this kind of conflict. "The commingled role proposed for Frontex will logically and inevitably result in its notices to the platforms being treated as proxy takedown orders," the coalition stated in a letter to Commissioners Henna Virkkunen and Magnus Brunner released this week. The worry is that Frontex would merge expedited reporting as a trusted flagger—a status available to certain government entities under the DSA—with the capacity to request that national authorities launch formal enforcement proceedings.

The organizations also raise questions about whether national authorities would maintain genuine independence when responding to requests from an EU-level agency, and whether people would enjoy adequate transparency and remedies if their content faced action. Asha Allen, secretary general of the Centre for Democracy and Technology Europe, emphasized that the DSA itself lacks explicit guardrails against state overreach through trusted flaggers. "The draft Guidelines provide some clarity on this, particularly point 31 which expressly recommends that government authorities who can issue Article 9 and 10 orders should not commingle their role by also being trusted flaggers," Allen told Tech Policy Press. "This proposal therefore goes against the Commission's own draft guidelines."

The comparison carries weight, though the guidelines remain non-binding. They articulate the Commission's reading of Article 22 and are meant to direct national regulators and platforms. Their ultimate legal standing and how member states implement them will prove consequential.

Disinformation and illegal content blur together

The breadth of Frontex's planned monitoring activities presents a separate worry. The proposed regulation would establish an Online Monitoring and Response Centre to scan publicly shared user-generated content relevant to EU external border and migration management. Activities would concentrate on material concerning unauthorized crossings, human smuggling, transnational crime, violence at borders and border infrastructure damage. The list extends to content involving disinformation, the weaponization of migration and other threats termed hybrid.

The proposal would also enable Frontex to work with authorities outside the EU on "the response to the online content identified" by the center, and would oblige the Commission to prepare a DSA crisis protocol for incidents at the EU's external borders. Criminal smuggling organizations are "growing increasingly professional, adapting rapidly and utilizing new technologies and social media to coordinate unauthorized crossings," Commission Executive Vice-President Henna Virkkunen stated when presenting the proposal in October.

At a subsequent press conference, Virkkunen said Frontex would apply for trusted flagger status through a national Digital Services Coordinator. She asserted that the agency possessed the specialized knowledge needed for designation and that platforms should treat its alerts as priority matters. On the trusted flagger function, Virkkunen remarked that if Frontex flags content that is "clearly disinformation," online platforms "should prioritize that."

Yet the DSA draws a crucial distinction between disinformation and illegal content. Article 22 addresses notices about unlawful material, not false or misleading speech generally. The DSA does not itself specify what counts as illegal content; that determination rests with applicable EU and national legislation. Falsehoods or politically sensitive statements are not inherently unlawful. This distinction becomes especially significant when monitoring material about migration, asylum and border enforcement. Statements about migration pathways, asylum processes or border official conduct may be contested or politically sensitive without violating law.

Civil society organizations warn that the proposed monitoring categories lack sufficient precision and could sweep in lawful speech. They caution that merging monitoring with trusted flagger authority and the power to request enforcement action could spur excessive flagging and heighten the danger of suppressing legitimate expression. They further highlight potential harms to migrant and asylum-seeking populations, who depend on social media to exchange information regarding border crossings, routes and support access.

Allen noted a pattern of law enforcement agencies invoking national security to persuade companies to take down online material, often with disproportionate effects on vulnerable communities. Prior incidents demonstrate the dangers of granting government bodies expedited channels to report content to platforms. In 2022, Meta's Oversight Board, an autonomous entity reviewing contested content decisions, reversed Meta's deletion of a UK drill music video from Instagram after a request from London's Metropolitan Police. The board characterized Meta's government request pathways as "haphazard and opaque" and urged publication of data on such requests.

The Commission defends its approach

In her October 27 remarks, Virkkunen stated "the DSA enforcement framework remains fully respected," with Frontex able to "act within its mandate on detection and signaling and directly engage with and alert platforms of its findings." Frontex could additionally ask national authorities to issue orders requiring a platform "to provide information or to act against illegal content," she added.

Under Article 22, trusted flagger candidates must show particular expertise and competence in spotting unlawful content, autonomy from online platforms, and capacity to file notices with diligence, precision and impartiality. The Commission's draft guidelines elaborate on how national coordinators should evaluate these standards. They direct authorities to assess an applicant's knowledge of relevant legal domains, its methods for detecting illegal material, its performance record and the controls it maintains to shield its judgments from political or other interference.

The guidelines demand heightened examination of an applicant's autonomy and objectivity, including whether its governance, financing or other backing might sway its choices. Allen acknowledged that the draft guidelines were thorough and incorporated numerous proposals from civil society, including scenarios depicting how government notices might function as covert removal demands. "However, like all guidelines, these are not binding rules and these specific guidelines are yet to be adopted," she said. "Which leads us to our present situation in which a proposal has been put on the table that not only undermines the text of the DSA, but the supplementary guidance aimed at helping member states implement these rules in line with fundamental rights."

The Commission's reasoning depends on a legal separation between Frontex detecting and reporting material, platforms evaluating notices, and national authorities issuing enforceable removal orders. Civil society contends that in practice, platforms may accord greater importance to notices from an EU body that simultaneously possesses the ability to request that national authorities launch enforcement proceedings.

The proposed regulation still requires negotiation between the European Parliament and the Council, with no public timetable for completion announced. Should it pass, Frontex would need approval from a national DSC, probably Poland, where it is based. Poland's DSA implementation has faced separate delays related to free speech disagreements.

The European Commission declined to provide comment.