Concentrated control over digital platforms harms both consumers and businesses relying on them. Allowing third parties to access services such as social networks, app stores and messaging systems would let them tap into network effects that expand audience reach and customer bases. The EU, Japan and the United States have all enacted or seriously debated competition laws designed to achieve this goal.
Yet the relationship between competition policy and data protection demands careful handling. While competition can push platforms to strengthen privacy practices, requiring them to interoperate and share data with third parties introduces genuine privacy risks. Critical questions remain unanswered: which data categories should move to third parties? How do we handle scenarios where a platform encrypts information but its interoperability partners do not?
These challenges are not insurmountable. Well-designed legislation and thoughtful implementation can advance both competition and privacy simultaneously.
A Global Wave of Tech Competition Laws
Competition frameworks targeting technology companies are spreading worldwide. The EU's Digital Markets Act (DMA) has emerged as an influential template, establishing requirements for large platforms. Japan's Mobile Software Competition Act (MSCA) applies comparable rules to mobile operating systems.
In the United States, Congress has examined the American Innovation and Choice Online Act (AICOA), while California explored its Blocking Anticompetitive Self-Preferencing by Entrenched Dominant Platforms (BASED) Act. Both measures generally restrict large platforms from favoring their own services, including through data sharing and interoperability mandates. The EU's DMA and Japan's MSCA contain similar provisions.
Interoperability Demands Differentiated Approaches
Interoperability requirements should account for how different platform services handle and safeguard information.
End-to-end encrypted messaging applications like iMessage and WhatsApp warrant particular caution. Enabling third-party interoperability with services offering secure encryption can spur competition, yet any weakening of encryption poses severe risks. A compromised encryption standard renders messages potentially accessible to anyone, including governments conducting warrantless mass surveillance.
Browser engines present another distinct case. They need specific types of platform access to function optimally during interoperability. This access must be structured to avoid undermining platform or device security—a continuing priority in DMA implementation.
Large platforms often employ stronger data protections than third parties do. When third parties gain data access through interoperability mandates, they may use, share or commercialize that information extensively. Encrypted messages resist use for targeted advertising, but interoperability without robust safeguards could allow third parties to exploit such data for commercial purposes. A platform encrypting user data like message alerts or location information might face DMA restrictions preventing it from requiring third parties to apply the same encryption, potentially enabling those parties to repurpose the data for advertising.
Platforms must not exploit security or privacy concerns as cover for blocking access or data sharing that would genuinely benefit consumers and competition. Users deserve choices and should not remain trapped with a single dominant provider. Interoperability serves as a vital mechanism for creating those alternatives.
Legislation Should Protect Both Values
Sound competition law should mandate the broadest feasible interoperability while preserving platforms' capacity to defend legitimate user privacy and security.
Different jurisdictions have adopted varying approaches. Japan's framework may offer the most promising model. Under the MSCA, a large mobile operating system can refuse interoperability or data sharing to prevent criminal activity and cybersecurity threats, with the Japan Fair Trade Commission evaluating each refusal individually. This case-by-case approach—assuming a rigorous, technical and impartial regulator—allows platforms to raise specific serious concerns while enabling regulators to verify whether risks and proposed safeguards are genuine.
The US approach differs. The AICOA would grant platforms an "affirmative defense," currently subject to heightened evidentiary standards, when refusing interoperability or data sharing is necessary to protect user privacy or security. Because platforms may face substantial legal expenses before demonstrating that a refusal is justified, this framework risks discouraging legitimate privacy protections.
When Privacy Law and Competition Law Intersect
Platform conduct mandated by privacy legislation does not breach competition law. However, privacy measures not required by law may trigger competition scrutiny. Regulators in France, Germany and other EU member states determined that Apple's requirement for app developers to obtain user consent before sharing data with third parties violated competition law, since Apple did not apply this consent prompt to itself—and the prompt was not mandated by GDPR. (Apple maintains it does not share user data with third parties, making the prompt inapplicable to its own conduct; nonetheless, Apple released an updated version of App Tracking Transparency for the EU.)
Finding the Right Balance
Competition and privacy are deeply connected, as data access can confer decisive competitive advantages. Tech competition legislation must acknowledge genuine privacy concerns arising from mandated data sharing and service interoperability. Simultaneously, dominant platforms cannot hide behind privacy justifications to shield anticompetitive conduct. Resolving both tensions creates the opportunity for genuine progress: more vigorous competition alongside stronger privacy protections.



