The Bundestag voted Friday to grant Germany's intelligence agencies expansive new capabilities, including the ability to penetrate foreign computer systems, disrupt adversarial supply chains and neutralize servers controlled by state-sponsored hostile actors. The vote—308 in favour, 190 opposed, 71 abstaining—represents the most comprehensive rewrite of Germany's espionage legislation in the postwar period, following approval of the draft by Chancellor Friedrich Merz's administration.

When the proposal was initially unveiled, Chancellery chief Nina Warken outlined potential applications: cyber operations targeting drone manufacturing facilities or chemical weapons sites, and disabling infrastructure controlled by state-backed hacking groups. The legislation fundamentally reshapes the mandate of both the BND, Germany's foreign intelligence agency, and the BfV, its domestic constitutional protection service, permitting them to move beyond passive surveillance toward active intervention.

Intelligence reform carries particular weight in Germany, where memories of the Gestapo and Stasi remain vivid. Yet the government has framed the changes as necessary responses to an increasingly volatile threat landscape, paralleling its decision to boost military expenditure following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt characterized the legislation as the "reform of the century" during parliamentary debate, asserting it would transform Germany's agencies into "genuine intelligence services" capable of operating "on equal footing with our European partners."

The BND gains authority to confront external threats directly rather than merely documenting them. The BfV receives a narrower toolkit for domestic operations—including data traffic blocking and rerouting—but remains barred from employing force against individuals, a power reserved exclusively for law enforcement. Both agencies acquire legal authorization to process large datasets using artificial intelligence and to perform biometric image matching against online sources.

Warken told lawmakers that foreign adversaries conduct covert operations against Germany daily, disguising "sabotage as an accident, espionage as business dealings, and propaganda as an opinion." The reforms would enable the BND to act "when no one else can," such as dismantling servers operated by state hacking collectives that steal from critical infrastructure operators.

Germany has grown more vocal about cyber threats, which officials attribute partly to Berlin's backing of Ukraine. In December, Germany summoned Russia's ambassador following a cyberattack on its air traffic control system attributed to APT28, and over a disinformation operation targeting its federal election. That campaign included fabricated videos apparently designed to sow discord among far-right Alternative for Deutschland (AfD) supporters, depicting the AfD absent from ballots or ballots marked for the party being destroyed.

The authorized powers fall considerably short of those wielded by several of Germany's closest allies. The legislation prohibits intelligence services from actions that could endanger human life or physical wellbeing, leaving the BND without capabilities comparable to France's DGSE or the CIA's Special Activities Center.

Amendments

Interior committee lawmakers introduced several modifications to the cabinet proposal this week, including granting both agencies the power to direct telecommunications firms to "freeze" traffic data anticipated for future use, preserving it pending satisfaction of legal access requirements. This authority is more restricted than powers available to counterpart agencies in Britain, France and the United States, where telecom companies face retention mandates of up to one year in Britain and France, and U.S. agencies can compel preservation for up to 180 days without judicial authorization under the Stored Communications Act.

The BND will retain metadata from bulk surveillance for 13 months instead of 12, while the BfV gains the power to investigate organized crime networks supporting extremism, work traditionally handled by police. Additional provisions establish guardrails on agency conduct—notably protecting Germans' communications with chatbots and search engines from BND surveillance using the same protections as person-to-person messages.

Amendments reinforce protections for medical professionals, though observers point out that journalists and lawyers receive less robust safeguards. Hacking operations and active measures within Germany require prior clearance from the Independent Control Council, the oversight body whose membership has expanded from six to twelve members.

One amendment provoked criticism from the far right, permitting the BfV to withhold information from individual state intelligence offices when concrete evidence suggests federal or state security risks. The change demands consent from a majority of state offices, though the BfV may act unilaterally in emergencies. AfD lawmaker Christian Wirth denounced the provision as a "Lex AfD," claiming it was designed to isolate states governed by parties the coalition opposes.

The BfV designated the AfD as a confirmed right-wing extremist organization last year, but a Cologne court suspended that classification while reviewing the party's legal objection. Until resolution, the agency may only treat the AfD as a suspected extremist group, a status constraining both surveillance methods and public statements. Regional intelligence agencies in eastern states including Saxony and Thuringia have independently classified their local AfD branches as confirmed extremists.

The AfD has never held state executive power, though its electoral support has grown substantially. In September, it secured 43.8% in Saxony-Anhalt, its strongest state election performance, falling short of a majority. Two weeks later, it finished first in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. Saxony-Anhalt's previous CDU-led administration continues as caretaker while other parties refuse coalition with the AfD.